Abstract. The Ring-LWE problem, introduced by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev (Eurocrypt 2010), has been steadily finding many uses in numerous cryptographic applications. Still, the Ring-LWE problem defined in [LPR10] involves the fractional ideal R ∨ , the dual of the ring R, which is the source of many theoretical and implementation technicalities. Until now, getting rid of R ∨ , required some relatively complex transformation that substantially increase the magnitude of the error polynomial and the practical complexity to sample it. It is only for rings R = Z[X]/(X n + 1) where n a power of 2, that this transformation is simple and benign. In this work we show that by applying a different, and much simpler transformation, one can transfer the results from [LPR10] into an "easyto-use" Ring-LWE setting (i.e. without the dual ring R ∨ ), with only a very slight increase in the magnitude of the noise coefficients. Additionally, we show that creating the correct noise distribution can also be simplified by generating a Gaussian distribution over a particular extension ring of R, and then performing a reduction modulo f (X). In essence, our results show that one does not need to resort to using any algebraic structure that is more complicated than polynomial rings in order to fully utilize the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem as a building block for cryptographic applications.
Introduction
Since its recent introduction, the Ring-LWE problem [LPR10] has already been used as a building block for numerous cryptographic applications. In addition to its original functionality as the basis of efficient lattice-based cryptosystems [LPR10] , it has since been used as a hardness assumption in the constructions of efficient signature schemes [MP11, Lyu11] , fully-homomorphic encryption schemes [BV11b, BV11a, BGV11, GHS11] , pseudo-random functions [BPR11] , protocols for doing secure multi-party computation [DPSZ11, LATV11] , and also gives an explanation for the hardness of the NTRU cryptosystem [SS11] .
A very natural way in which one would like to be able to define the (decisional) Ring-LWE problem is as follows: for a polynomial ring R q = Z q [X]/(f (X)) and a random polynomial w ∈ R q , it is computationally hard to distinguish the uniform distribution over R q × R q from ordered pairs of the form (a i , a i w + e i ), where a i are uniformly distributed in R q and e i are polynomials in R whose coefficients are independently distributed Gaussians. Unfortunately, the results from This work was partially supported by the European Research Council.
[LPR10] do not directly imply that the above problem is hard based on the worstcase hardness of lattice problems, except in the one case when f (X) = X n +1 for n a power of 2, and thus most papers that use the Ring-LWE problem only use this one specific ring. The reason for this limitation is that the problem statement in [LPR10] requires w to be in the dual ring of R (which is a fractional ideal) and for the distribution of the noise to be a spherical Gaussian in the embedding representation of R. And it is only in the case that R = Z[X]/(X n + 1) that the dual ring is simply a scaling of R (thus, one can simply multiply by the scaling and end up in R) and the embedding is just a rigid rotation and a scaling (thus the spherical Gaussian distribution is not affected by the transformation). For all other cyclotomic polynomials, while it is possible to transform the problem that was proved hard in [LPR10] to the one described above, the transformation between the polynomial and embedding representations involves multiplication by a skewed matrix, and the dual of R is a (possibly very) skewed fractional ideal of R. Therefore there is no obvious way to generate the noise directly in the ring R, nor work entirely in the ring R without utilizing a transformation that can substantially increase the magnitude of the error polynomials.
A natural question to ask at this point is whether there is ever a reason to use a ring other than R q = Z q [X]/(X n + 1). While it's true that this ring has some very nice features, and we believe that it should be used whenever possible, there are situations where an alternative may be preferable. Since X n + 1 is only irreducible when n is a power of 2, these polynomials are scarce. Thus it is conceivable that to achieve a certain security level, it may be advantageous to try to find a polynomial of some particular degree rather than round up to the next power of 2. A different, and a probably even stronger reason to use a different ring, is that other cyclotomic polynomials may have a more desirable structure for the task at hand. An example of this is the recent result of Gentry, Halevi, and Smart [GHS11] who show that there are particular cyclotomic polynomials that allow for much faster (at least asymptotically) instantiations of fully-homomorphic encryption. Their hardness assumption is that the Ring-LWE problem, instantiated with polynomial rings as in our description above, is a difficult problem. Using the result of our current paper, it can actually be shown that their scheme has tight connections to worst-case lattice problems (modulo a small change in the way the errors are generated, but this can be easily remedied).
Our Results
Our main result (Theorem. 2) essentially shows that for any cyclotomic polynomial Φ m (X), one can work entirely in the ring Z[X]/(Φ m ), and generate the noise distribution without resorting to complex embeddings.
Our analysis (Sect. 5) shows that for primes m (and even wider class) our simplification comes at almost no cost in term of algorithmic simplicity, tightness and efficiency compared to the scarce class of m that are powers of 2 as used for practical application in [LPR10] ; thus increasing the density of usable m < M from O(log(M )/M ) to O(1/log(M )).
The polynomial Θm is defined to be X m − 1 if m is odd, and X m/2 + 1 when m is even.
Our main result is a consequence of two theorems with surprisingly elementary proofs. The first theorem (see Section 4) states that every cyclotomic ring
What this means is that one can scale everything that is in R ∨ by a factor of m (or m/2) and end up in the ring R. Similarly, if something were uniform, either statistically or computationally, modulo R ∨ , then m times it will be uniform modulo mR ∨ and thus uniform modulo R, since mR ∨ is an additive subgroup of R. This transformation is not completely tight (except in the case that Φ m (X) = X m/2 + 1) because we end up with something that is uniform modulo a subgroup of R, whereas we only use the randomness modulo R. This loss of tightness, however, is very small, resulting in the noise being at most m/φ(m) "larger than necessary" (see the discussion after Theorem 2).
Our second theorem (see Section 5) deals with the noise generation. In the Ring-LWE definition of [LPR10] , the noise needs to be a spherical Gaussian in the canonical embedding representation of the ring Q[X]/(Φ m ) (see Figure 1) , and to convert it to the polynomial representation, one needs to perform transformation σ −1 •T , where σ −1 is the multiplication by the inverse of a complex Vandermonde matrix (and T is a multiplication by a very simple matrix). Ideally, one would like to avoid working with the complex numbers and generate the noise by simply drawing it from the ring Q[X]/(Φ m ); but unfortunately this method does not lead to the correct distribution in the embedding representation. What we show is that an almost equally simple way of generating the noise does lead to the correct distribution. We consider the ring Q[X]/(Θ m ), where Θ m (X) = X m − 1 if m is odd, and X m/2 + 1 if m is even (notice that Φ m is a factor of Θ m ). We then show that the transformation denoted by T −1 • γ from Q[X]/(Θ m ) to the embedding representation actually preserves the spherical Gaussian distribution! This means that one can sample in Q[X]/(Θ m ) by picking each coefficient independently from a continuous Gaussian distribution (rounded to Q, see details in 2), and it will be the correct distribution required by [LPR10] . Then to move the noise from Q[X]/(Θ m ) to Q[X]/(Φ m ), one simply performs the transformation β, which is just a reduction modulo Φ m .
Similar technique were independently developed in the work of Gentry, Halevi and Smart, but used for different purpose. Precisely they also use lifting to the the ring extension Z[X]/Θ m (X) during their decryption procedure [GHS11,
Lemma 12]; and the considered polynomial G m can implicitly be seen in our proof of Theorem 3. In some sense, our work show that such a lifting is also natural during the encryption to obtain tighter security reduction.
In addition to making our noise generation much simpler to implement, the reduction modulo Φ m is also simpler to analyze than σ −1 • T . This allows us to make several improvements in constructions that use rings other than Z[X]/(X n + 1) (for rings Z[X]/(X n + 1), the mapping β is just the identity, and so there is nothing to analyze). As realized in previous works that used ideal lattices (e.g. [LM06, Gen10, GHS11] ), multiplication in polynomial rings increases the size of the coefficients by a factor that depends on the size of the coefficients in the multiplicands, and also on the ring itself, and the ring in which the coefficients grow the least is Z q [X]/(X n + 1). As a consequence, if one were to, for example, implement the encryption scheme from [LPR10] in the ring Z[X]/(Φ 2 k p ) for some prime p, we observe in Section 5 that the noise grows by a factor of approximately √ 2 larger than in the ring Z[X]/(X n + 1), and a factor at most 2p in the ring Z[X]/(Φ 2 k pq ) for two primes p < q.
Last, we show that by analyzing the shape of the noise in the ring Q[X]/(Φ p ), one can actually remove some of the noise that is introduced by the reduction modulo Φ p ; it seems that our strategy makes the coefficients grow only (1 + o(1)) times as much (see Section 6).
Preliminaries
Cyclotomic Ring Let ζ m be a primitive m th root of unity and the cyclotomic polynomial Φ m (X) ∈ Q[X] be its minimal monic polynomial. Thus m is the smallest integer for which ζ ∨ , is the fractional ideal
, where Φ m is the derivative of Φ m . While the dual has many nice properties and is extensively used in the proof of the hardness of Ring-LWE in [LPR10] , in the current paper we only need its definition.
Embeddings of cyclotomic fields
is defined as the direct sum of all the embeddings : σ(x) = k∈Z * m σ k (x). Note that that for each k ∈ Z * m and any x ∈ Q(ζ m ), we have σ −k (x) = σ k (x). Thus for a proper indexation of Z * m the image H of σ is the Q vector space generated by the columns of √ 2 · T where :
In other words, for any element x ∈ Q(ζ m ), there exists a vector v ∈ Q φ(m) such that σ(x) = √ 2T v, and vice versa. For the rest of the paper, we will consider the column vectors of T as the canonical basis for the embedding space H.
Gaussian Distributions By ψ s we denote the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation s over R; and by ψ For our purpose, one would like the Gaussian distributions to be defined over Q rather than R, so that an element drawn from ψ φ(m) s may be seen as element of the field Q(ζ m ). The theoretical solution to that issues is to work with the tensor product Q(ζ m ) ⊗ Q R as done in [LPR10] .
However, in practice elements needs to be represented finitely, typically using floating points numbers of a fixed mantissa. For simplicity we choose this solution: we consider that output of Gaussian distribution ψ d s are rounded off to rational numbers using a fine enough grid so that all our results go through except with a negligibly small probability.
The Main Result
In this section we give the main result of this paper. We describe a distribution over R q × R q , where R q = Z q [X]/(Φ m ) which is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over R q ×R q based on the worst-case hardness of the approximate shortest vector problem in ideal lattices. The proof of our theorem will use results that we later prove in Sections 4 and 5 that will aid us in transforming the hard Ring-LWE problem defined in [LPR10] into one in which all operations are performed in polynomial rings.
Theorem 1 ([LPR10]
). Let m be integer, and q be a prime congruent to 1 modulo m. Let denote K be the number field Q(ζ m ), R = Z[ζ m ] be its ring of integers, R ∨ be the fractional ideal
, q be a prime congruent to 1(mod m). Also, let k be any positive integer and α ∈ (0, 1) be a real number such that αq > ω √ log m . If there exists an algorithm that can solve the decisional Ring-LWE problem, that is distinguish (with some advantage 1/poly(m)) between k uniformly random samples drawn from R/qR × K/R ∨ and k samples (a i ,
∨ where a i are chosen uniformly at random from R/qR, w is chosen uniformly at random from R ∨ /qR ∨ , and the e i are sampled in the embedding space H from the distribution ψ
, then there exists a quantum algorithm that runs in time O(q·poly(m)) that solves the approximate Shortest Vector Problem to within a factorÕ(
Before stating our main theorem, we believe that it would be helpful to first understand why everything turns out to be so simple and convenient when working with the ring of integers Z[ζ m ] when m is a power of 2 (and not so convenient otherwise). If m is a power of 2, then Φ m = x n + 1, where n = m/2, and therefore Φ = nX n−1 , and so Φ (ζ m ) = nζ n−1 m . The last equation implies that nζ n−1 m R ∨ = R (and since ζ j m R = R for any integer j, we have nR ∨ = R), which gives us a very simple way to remove the ring R ∨ and work entirely in the ring R. When given a sample (a i ,
∨ , we can simply multiply the second element of the ordered pair by n and get (a i ,
∨ . Now we observe that since the e i were chosen from
, the ne i are distributed according to ψ
ns . And since w was chosen uniformly at random from R ∨ /qR ∨ , we have that nw is uniformly random in R/qR. Thus the problem of distinguishing uniformly random samples in R/qR × K/R from samples (a i , aiw q + e i ) ∈ R/qR × K/R where a i and w are drawn uniformly from R/(q) and the e i are drawn according to the distribution ψ φ(m) ns is exactly equivalent to the problem from Theorem 1. We now turn to how one would generate the errors e i directly in the ζ m power basis, without first generating them in the embedding space and then doing the transformation. The main observation here is that the linear transformation σ −1 • T (see Figure  1 ) from the embedding space H to the power basis representation turns out to be a multiplication by a scaled orthogonal matrix. Therefore, the spherical Gaussian distribution in H remains a spherical Gaussian distribution in the power basis representation, and can therefore be sampled directly in the latter domain.
On the other hand, if ζ m is a primitive root of unity for any other m except a power of 2, then neither of the above-described conditions hold. It is still possible to multiply elements in R ∨ by Φ (ζ m ) in order to take them into R, but this transformation does not result in "nice" distributions in the power basis of R. It is known that there exist cyclotomic polynomials Φ m whose coefficients are of the order of m log m , and thus Φ m also has coefficients of that magnitude. Therefore when multiplying an element by Φ (ζ m ), the coefficients of the product in the power basis will also very likely have such large coefficients, and thus the noise will increase by a super-polynomial factor. And even for simple cyclotomic polynomials such as Φ p for some prime p, its derivative will have Ω(p) coefficients of size Ω(p), and so the multiplication by Φ p could increase the coefficients by a factor of p 2 . Additionally, if ζ m is a primitive root of unity and m is not a power of 2, then the mapping σ −1 • T from the embedding space H to the power basis representation is no longer an orthogonal linear map, and thus the spherical Gaussian distribution is no longer preserved.
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem). Let m be an integer, and let R q be the ring
where q is a prime congruent to 1 modulo m. Also, let k be any positive integer, α ∈ (0, 1) be a real number such that αq > ω √ log m , and define m to be equal to m if m is odd and m/2 if m is even. If there is an algorithm that can solve the Ring-LWE problem, that is distinguish (with some advantage 1/poly(m)) between k uniformly random samples drawn from R q × R q and k samples (a i , a i w + e i ) ∈ R q × R q , where a i and w are chosen uniformly at random from R q and e i = e i mod Φ m with
; then there exists a quantum algorithm that Before we give the proof of this theorem (which uses results from Sections 4 and 5), we would like to draw the reader's attention to several things.
First, we emphasize that the error distribution is generated by sampling a polynomial g 0 + g 1 X + . . .
where g i simply are independants Gaussian variables, then reducing modulo Φ m , and only then rounding each coefficient to the nearest integer. While it would have been slightly more convenient to be able to round and then do a reduction modulo Φ m , the two distributions are not equivalent.
Secondly, we point out that by using a Lemma similar to [ACPS09, Lemma 2], it can be shown that instead of choosing the secret w uniformly from R q , it can be drawn from the same distribution as the error vectors e i . The only consequence of this is that the value of k in the theorem increases by one.
A third comment is that just as in Theorem 1, the
term in the standard deviation of the error is a consequence of converting elliptic distributions into spherical ones in [LPR10] . It is unclear whether having this term is actually necessary for hardness or whether the elliptical distributions in [LPR10] are an artifact of the proof, and so in practice it may be enough to just sample with standard deviation √ m αq. Fortunately, most constructions involving Ring-LWE only require a small (usually a constant or a logarithmic) number of samples, and so for theoretical applications when one does not care too much about small polynomial factors, this term does not cause too much trouble.
The final comment that we would like to make is about the "tightness" of our reduction. It is natural to wonder whether our transformation from Ring-LWE in the domain in Theorem 1 to the one in the domain in Theorem 2 is tight, in the sense that one did not need to add more noise than necessary in order to obtain pseudo-randomness in R q × R q . We now give an intuition for why the transformation is actually rather tight. Ignoring the
term, which is a possibly removable artifact carried over from Theorem 1, the required noise in our new theorem is √ m αq, where there is a requirement that αq > ω( √ log m). Thus the noise must have standard deviation at least ω( √ m log m). This is almost tight because by the result of Arora and Ge [AG11] , if the standard deviation were o( φ(m)), then the Ring-LWE problem could be solved in subexponential time 2 o(φ(m)) , which would them imply that the Shortest Vector Problem could be solved in sub-exponential time as well. And since m /φ(m) = O( √ log log m), this is essentially the maximum tightness factor that we lose during our reduction.
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem, we will show how one can transform the samples from Theorem 1 into samples from the ring R q × R q . Given samples of the form (a i , a i w/q + e i ) ∈ R q × Q(ζ m )/R ∨ where a i are chosen uniformly at random from R q , w is chosen uniformly at random from R ∨ q , and the e i are sampled from the distribution ψ φ(m) s in the embedding space H, we scale the second element of each ordered pair by a factor of m q to obtain elements (a i , a i wm +qm e i ) = (a i , a i w +e i ) ∈ R q ×Q(ζ m )/qm R ∨ where w is distributed uniformly at random in m R ∨ /m qR ∨ , and e i are sampled from the distribution
sm q . Since we did nothing but scaling at this point, it is clear that distinguishing these ordered pairs from uniform ones in R q × Q(ζ m )/qm R ∨ is as hard as the original problem from Theorem 1. We now apply Theorem 3 which states that m R ∨ ⊆ R to conclude that if we reduce the second entry of the ordered pairs modulo qR to obtain elements (a i , a i w + e i ) ∈ R q × Q(ζ m )/qR where w is distributed uniformly at random in m R ∨ /qR, and e i are sampled from the distribution ψ φ(m) sm q , the distinguishing problem is at least as difficult as before. We now make the observation that instead of choosing w uniformly at random from m R ∨ /qR, we can choose it from R/qR without making the problem any easier. The reason is that given a pair (a i , a i w + e i ), we can choose a uniformly random w ∈ R/qR and output (a i , a i w +a i w +e i ) = (a i , a i (w +w )+ e i ), and the secret w + w is uniform in R/qR. We can also observe that if we consider the element a i w + e i in the power-basis representation and round each coefficient to the nearest integer, it is equivalent to only rounding the error term e i to the nearest integer because the product a i w already has integer coefficients. Thus the problem of distinguishing rounded elements (a i , a i s + e i ) ∈ R q × R q from random elements in R q × R q is at least as difficult as the problem from Theorem 1. The last thing we need to address is the noise generation. Currently, the e i are generated from the distribution ψ φ(m) sm q in the embedding space H. Theorem 5 states that to obtain such a distribution, it is equivalent to sample the distribution g 0 + g 1 X + . . .
where each g i is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation that is √ m times smaller than that required in the distribution in the embedding space H. And this is exactly the distribution from which the errors come from in the statement of our Theorem.
Mapping
In this section we prove that the element m Φ m (ζm)
. By taking the derivative of both sides, we obtain the equation
or equivalently,
Evaluating both sides at ζ m , we obtain
since ζ 
where the last inclusion is true because g(X) ∈ Z[X], and so g(ζ m ) ∈ R.
We get that if we multiply the different ideal by m , we find a set included in the ring of integer. In fact, we prove in Appendix A that m is the smallest integer which verifies this property. It essencially comes from the fact that m is the radical of the finite group R ∨ /R, namely the least common multiple of orders of the elements in this group. As proved in App.A we get this following characterization:
Theorem 4. A integer k is such that kR ∨ ⊂ R if and only if m divides k.
Geometry and Error Sampling
For the rest of the paper, let m ∈ Z denote m/2 if m is even, and m if m is odd. All the proofs of this sections are given in App. B.
To obtain the correct distribution of the error polynomials in the Ring-LWE problem in Theorem 1, we want the noise distribution over Q[X]/(Φ m ) to map to a spherical Gaussian in the embedding space H. This is not a problem if the map T −1 • σ is a scaled-orthonormal map, which is the case when m is a power of two. For a general m, a natural solution would be to generate the noise in the space H and then map it to Q[X]/(Φ m ), however this requires dealing with the inverse Vandermonde matrix of σ −1 , making the noise generation much less efficient.
To overcome this technical issue, we use the ring extension Q[X]/(Θ m ) and show that it is a the natural ring for the error generation. First unlike Q[X]/(Φ m ) the canonical embedding from this ring preserves sphericity of Gaussian distributions: thus one just needs to sample a spherical Gaussian in this extension then reduce modulo φ m .
Theorem 5 (Geometry of Secondly, for a large class of integers m the reduction modulo Φ m has a very simple and sparse matrix representation in the power basis. The knowledge of this matrix representation simplifies the geometric analysis of the error and products of errors, leading to some better theoretical bounds for correct decryption (see lemma 7), detailed below.
Analysis of β, the reduction modulo Φ m
First, if B is very sparse and structured, this reduction can be implemented in a very simple ad-hoc way, while having better practical running time than general quasi-linear reduction algorithms. We will show that it is the case when m = 2 k p for a any prime p, and also when m = 2 k p p if p is a small prime. Secondly, error distributions in the Q[X]/(Φ m ) representation depend on the geometry of B, and thus the norms of B have an impact on the relation between m, s and q : the smaller the norms are, the smaller q one may choose while ensuring correct decryption. In particular, for any e ∈ Q[X]/(Θ m ) we have : β(e) ∞ ≤ B 1 e ∞ , which is related to the expansion factor inequality [LM06] . One may indeed only deal only with the expansion factor of Φ m , and bound the error preimage in Q[X]/(Θ m ). As described later, the main part of the error that needs to be dealt with for decryption has the form ab + cd where a, b, c, d are drawn according to β(ψ 
Since β is ring morphism, preserving products as well as sums, this translate to
However, the exact knowledge of B, together with the knowledge of the error distribution may lead to better bounds. While there is no simple explicit formula for B in general, some specific values of m makes B very simple. Obviously, when m is a power of two, B is the identity since Θ m = Φ m . When m = 2 k p i for k ∈ N and i ∈ N * we have:
Id p−1 . . .
The second form of B comes from some formulae on cyclotomic polynomials. See 8 and 9 in Appendix B.3 for these latter. Furthermore, in that case, a better bound can be proved, replacing the constant B 1 = 2 by B 2 = √ 2. This statement raises the interesting question of whether it can be generalized to other values m, i.e. can we replace B 1 by B 2 (while keeping the exponent of E(τ ) big enough) ? While such constant B 2 applies to Gaussian errors, its not clear if it applies in general for products of Gaussians.
Other polynomials Φ m For general values of m the coefficients of B may be much bigger, and can even grow exponentially in m for product of many primes. Few is known about the behavior of the coefficients of Φ m in terms of the prime decomposition of m, however Lam and Leung proved in [LL96] that Φ pq for two primes p and q have its coefficient in {−1, 0, 1}.
A generalization of their proof gives a more detailed behavior:
Theorem 8. If m is on the form m = 2 k p i q j where p q are two odd primes, k ∈ N and i, j are non-zero integers, B has coefficients in {−1, 0, 1} and B 1 = 2 min(p, q).
Improved Decryption Additionally, the explicit knowledge of B can suggest strategies to improve the tolerance of the decryption algorithm. Such an idea is described when m = p is a prime integer in section 6.4. It seems to improve the tolerance, replacing the B 2 = √ 2 factor by ≈ 1.16 for dimension m ≈ 500; and seems to be 1 + o(1) when the dimension grows. With that improvement the tolerance loss compared to the encryption scheme based on Φ 2 k can becomes marginal.
In this section we present an application example of our result, that is an adaptation of the [LPR10] scheme to general polynomial Φ m , and sketch strategies to improve the decryption rate.
Definition
We consider m to be our main security parameter, and we assume it grows in an unbounded set of integer S such that B 1 is polynomially bounded :
For example, we can take b = 0 for the set S = 2 k p|k ∈ Z, p is prime , while S = 2 k pq|k ∈ Z, p, q are prime gives b = 1/2.
Choose some small ∈ (0, 1/4), and set other parameters to grow as follow : the modulus q = Θ(m 2+b+2 ), and the standard deviation s = Θ(m 3/4+ ). Our encryption scheme is as follows :
-Gen(1 m ) : Sample w, e 1 ← ψ m s , and a uniformly in R q . Setw = β(w) andē 1 = β(e 1 ) The private keyw = β(w) ∈ R q and the public key is (a,t) wheret = aw +ē 1 mod q ∈ R q -Encrypt(t ∈ R q , µ ∈ {0, 1} φ(m) ) : To encrypt the message µ under the public keyt, draw r, e 2 , e 3 ← ψ m s , and setr = β(r) ,ē 2 = β(e 2 ) and e 3 = β(e 3 ) . Output (u, v) ∈ R q × R q where u = ar +ē 2 mod q and v =tr +ē 3 + µ q/2 mod q.
-Decrypt(w ∈ R q , (u, v) ∈ R q × R q ) : To decrypt (u, v) with the private keyw, compute d = v − uw ∈ R q , and decrypt the i-th bit µ i as 0 if d i ∈ [−q/4; q/4], and as 1 otherwise.
Security
We prove semantic security based on the hardness of the approximate Shortest Vector Problem to within a factorÕ(m 5/2+b+ ). For any constant number of samples k set :
To fulfill the condition of theorem 2, we verify that :
Note that we use the main theorem 2 in its modified form that replaces the uniform distribution of the secret w by the same Gaussian distribution as the error (see the discussion under the statement of theorem 2).
First, the public key distribution (ā,t =āw +ē 1 ) follows the distribution defined in theorem 2 relatively to w which is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution. Thus for k = 2, our theorem states that this public key (ā,t) is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over R q × R q .
We can now assume that (ā,t) is uniformly random, in which case (a, u = ar +ē 2 ) and (t, v =tr +ē 2 ) are two samples following the distribution of theorem 2, wherer is once again Gaussian. Using theorem 2 with k = 3, we deduce that (a, u) and (t, v ) are also is indistinguishable from random, so is v = v + µ q/2 That concludes the security proof.
Correctness
During decryption, we get : d = v − uw = (āw + e 1 )r +ē 3 + µ q/2 − (ār +ē 2 ) mod q =ē 1r +ē 3 +ē 2w + µ q/2 mod q Thus, the decryption will be correct if ē ∞ < q/4 whereē =ē 1r +ē 3 + e 2w . First, note that the rounding operations have a limited effect on the final result of the errorē : the difference between that computation with and without rounding is bounded byÕ(B 1 m s) =Õ(m 7/4+b+ ), this negligible compared to q = Θ(m 2+b+2 ). Similarly, one can neglect the contribution ofē 3 since ē 3 ∞ ≤ O( B 1 s) =Õ(m 3/4+b+ ). According to lemma 6, we have that ē ∞ ≤Õ( B 1 √ ms 2 ) ≤Õ(m 2+b+ ) except with negligible probability. On the other hand, q grows as Θ(m 2+b+2 ), thus, decryption is correct with overwhelming probability for large enough values of m.
Practical Improvements
For applications, any tricks to decrease the minimal value of q while preserving correct decryption might be worthwhile. We hereby presents two independent ideas.
Recovering approximation of the error preimage e ∈ Z[X]/(Θ m ) This first idea concerns the decryption algorithm. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to m = p a prime. In this case we have for each index i ≤ p − 2 that e i = e i − e p−1 where e = e 1 r + e 3 + e 2 w ∈ Z[X]/(Θ m ). Thus if we recover a good approximation x of e p−1 we might reduce the error by adding x to each coordinate. Without warping modulo q, an approximation of e p−1 may be recovered as the average
i=0ē i ; the error should be less than ≈ τ s 2 , using the heuristic that e behave like a spherical Gaussian.
However, we need to considerē i modulo q/2 to get rid of the message. Our heuristic algorithm proceeds as follow : for a certain constant α ∈ (0, 1), find (one of) the smallest interval [a, b] such that for at least α(p − 1) indexes i ∈ [p − 1] verifiesē i ∈ ([a, b] mod q/2). Consider a i ∈ Z as the unique integer representinḡ e i ∈ Z q/2 in [a, b], compute the average x of those a i , and output the smallest representative of − x modulo q/2 as an approximation of e p−1 . Note that this algorithm can be implemented in quasi-linear time, by sorting the values e i .
Our experiments indicates that such a strategy decrease the √ 2 ≈ 1.41 factor to ≈ 1.16 for m = 503 and α = 0.9, and keeps decreasing when the dimension grows. We conjecture that it asymptotically decrease as 1 + o(1). Similar idea should apply to m = 2 k p. While this suggest that the quality loss compared to cryptosystem based on the Φ 2 k polynomial can be almost reduced to nothing, implementing such a error recovery strategy would require more study.
Rejection during Key Generation
The second idea consist of modifying the key generation algorithm Gen so that the couple (s, e 1 ) is rejected whenever (s|e 1 ) ≥ √ 2m τ s, where τ is chosen such that E(τ ) 2n ≤ 1/2; only half of them are rejected, thus the advantage of the adversary is no more than doubled. For m ≥ 500 this improves our bound by τ /τ ≈ 1.4/1.05. The same idea applies when using the tight bound of lemma 7 by rejecting (s,ē 1 ) depending on
A Proof of Theorem 4
First of all, we remind some facts about free abelian groups of finite rank directly apply to Z[X]/(Φ m ) and its different ideal. For conciseness, we will note R for the ring
Definition 9. Let G be a group and I a set. We says that a family of element (e i ) i∈I of G is a basis of G is every element of G can be written uniquely as a finite linear combination with integer coefficients of elements of this family. If I is finite, this cardinal is called the rank of G.
Notations For two integers k and n, the predicate k|n denotes that k divides n. Also, let n be an integer and p a prime numbers. We define the order of n at p, denoted by ord p (n), as the positive integer α such that p α |n and p α+1 does not divide n. It is the exponent of p in the prime decomposition of n if p|n, and 0 otherwise.
Fact 10 There exists a basis (e i ) 1≤i≤φ(m) for R ∨ and φ(m) positive integer
Proof: All elements of R can be uniquely written as a linear combination with integer coefficients of (ζ i m ) 0≤i≤φ(m)−1 , as this family is rationally independent. In a similar way, we have that all elements of R ∨ can be uniquely written as a linear combination with integer coefficients of ( 
Besides, in our case, r = φ(m) and ∀i < r, b i = 0. Indeed, let's notice that A is a change-of-basis matrix for two Q-basis of Q(ζ m ), then invertible, and then its determinant is non-zero. But det(D) = det(U AV ) = det(U ) det(A) det(V ) = det(A), because U and V are unimodular, and thus have their determinant equal to ±1.
This decomposition of A gives us a basis (e i ) 1≤i≤φ(m) for R ∨ and φ(m)
Thanks to this result, we can state two immediate consequences. We proceed by assuming that ord p (m) > ord p (b φ(m) ), and show that it is absurd. From Fact 10 we have b i |b i+1 for all i < φ(m). Thus: ord p (m) − 1 ≥ ord p (b i ) and summing over all i we get:
Fact 11 tells us that:
and therefore
Combining with the inequality (2) we deduce:
which is absurd since p > 2. We actually get that ord 
This last equation implies that if a random variable v ∈ Q[X]/(Θ m ) has covariance s 2 ·Id m then the covariance of (
m denote the coefficients of C = G · G t . For all i, j ∈ Z * m we have: 
B.2 Proofs of error bounds
We start with usefull facts for our proofs.
Tailcut We first recall a standard fact to tailcut Gaussian distribution, that will be required for our proofs.
Fact 13 (Tailcut of Gaussian distribution) Let n be an integer, and let x be distributed according to a Spherical Gaussian distribution over R n of width s. For any τ > 1 the probability that x > τ √ ns is less than E(τ ) n where
Note that when n is large, having τ = 2 guarantees the bound x ≤ √ nτ s with overwhelming probability (more than 1 − 2 −n ). In dimension n = 1, τ = 12 guarantees the bound except with probability ≈ 2 −100 . (a) ) is the circulant (resp. anti-circulant) matrix whose first column forms the coefficients of a. Note that for any polynomials a, Circ(a) = Acirc(a) = a , since each row of Circ(a) and Acirc(a) have the same coefficient as a up to sign and permutation.
Products in
Proof of Lemma 6 Since a, b, c, d are polynomial over Z[X]/(Θ m (X)), e = ab+cd can be written as :
Each row of (Circ(a)| Circ(c)) has norm (a|c) . Knowing a and c, the marginal distribution of e i is a Gaussian distribution of standard deviation s (a|c) . Thus, each coefficient e i verifies |e i | ≤ (a|c) τ s except with probability E(τ ). The vector (a|c) is distributed according to ψ 2m s thus, except with probability E(τ ) 2n
we have (a|c) ≤ √ 2m τ s. We conclude by the union bound.
Proof of Lemma 7 For simplicity, we only present the proof for case where k = 0, that is when m = p is a prime integer. We start by rewriting e = β(ab + cd) as :
and considering the form of B, we have :
where C(a) is (p − 1) × p matrix with coefficients [C(a)] i,j = a i−j mod p − a 1−j mod p . We show that for each row r of C (a) (let say, the i-th row where i ∈ {0 . . . p − 2}), there exist a partition J 0 J 1 J 2 = [p] such that each a k appears at most once as a term of r j = a i−j mod p − a 1−j mod p at most once in each sub-vector r J0 , r J1 , r J2 , and where #J 0 , #J 1 , #J 2 ≥ p/3 . For that, consider the graph G i whose vertices set is [p] and with edges between k and l if r k and r l contains a shared term a j . There is such an edge exactly when |k − l| = i + 1 mod p. Since i + 1 ∈ {1 . . . p − 1}, i + 1 is coprime with p, G i is isomorphic to the cyclic graph C p which has [p] as set of vertices and connects k to l if and only if |k − l| = 1 mod p. It remains to describe a balanced 3-coloring for the cyclic graph C p : for each k ∈ [3 p/3 ] put the vertex k in the bucket J k mod 3 . If p = 3 we are done; if p = 1 mod 3, puts p − 1 in J 2 ; last if p = 2 mod 3 puts p − 2 in J 1 and p − 1 in J 2 .
Using that index partition, one may break each row of (B ·Circ(a)|B ·Circ(c)) into three vectors r 1 , r 2 , r 3 of dimension at least 2 p/3 , and the coefficient of each of them are independant Gaussian variable of variance √ 2s. Thus, except, with a probability less than 3p E(τ ) 2 p/3 all rows r verifies r ≤ τ s √ 2p. The rest of the proof is then similar to the proof of lemma 6.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 8
As discussed in the section 5, the simpler the matrix B, the more efficient the reduction modulo Φ m . Also, it turns out that for m on the form 2 k p i q j , the matrix B besides to be very sparse, has its coefficient in {−1, 0, 1}. Before beginning the main real proof, we state a lemma which will be useful.
Lemma 14. Let p and q two different odd primes, with p < q, for all k ∈ [0, p−2] there exists (r, s) ∈ N 2 such that:
Proof: First we prove that for k ∈ [0, p − 2], there exist two integers u and v such that k + 1 = up + vq, |u| < q and |v| < p.
As p and q are coprime, by the Chinese Remainder theorem, there exist two integersũ andṽ such that k + 1 =ũp +ṽq. Let's make the division ofũ by q: u = aq + u with |u| < q. And let's set v =ṽ + a. Then k + 1 = up + vq, and as |u| < q, it remains to prove that |v| < q.
Indeed v = 
where A 1 and A 2 are two matrix of dimension (φ(pq) − 1) × (p − 1) with coefficient in {−1, 0, 1}. Moreover, the first line of A 1 have its coefficients equals to -1 and the first line of A 2 have its coefficients equals to 1.
Proof: For l ∈ [0, pq − 1],the l th column of B is the decomposition of ζ l pq in the power basis {ζ j pq | j ∈ [0, φ(pq) − 1]}. We divide the analysis of these columns in four blocks.
1. First block: l ∈ [0, φ(pq) − 1] The decomposition is obvious, which give the first block.
In a second time, we are going to find the claimed matrix
. There exists by the lemma 14 r, s such that φ(pq) + k = rq + sp, r ∈ [0, q − 2] and s ∈ [0, p − 2]. As ζ q pq is a primitive p th root of unity, and ζ p pq is a primitive q th root of unity, we have the following expression:
If we multiply the two latter, and reminding that φ(pq) + k = rq + sp we get: 0 = 
We use here the convention that b i=a = 0 if a > b. We check easily that all the exponents in S 2 are between 0 and φ(pq) − 1. The problem is the exponents of S 1 is greater than pq, but ζ 
Here is the decomposition of ζ φ(pq)+k pq in the power basis: all the exponents in S 1 and S 2 are now between 0 and φ(pq) − 1. Finally, it remains to check the expected form of A 1 , namely that the coefficient in the decomposition 5 are −1, 0 or 1, and 1 appears in this decomposition with coefficient −1. The latter point is clear because 1 appears in S 2 for i = 0, j = 0. For the former point, let's notice that all the exponent in the decomposition 5 are different. Clearly the exponents inside each sums S 1 and S 2 are different, but also the exponents between both: indeed, assume that there is an exponent appearing in both, and without loss of generality we have s ≤ r, then there would exist four integers i, j, q, b such that: 
And, the analysis of this decomposition is similar to the one for the second block. That's why A 1 and A 2 have the same form.
The particular case on which we have just focused, allows us to conclude. Indeed if we define the radical of an integer m to be the product of the prime numbers dividing m, just by definition of cyclotomic polynomials, we have the following formula which links the m th cyclotomic polynomial to the rad(m) th cyclotomic polynomial:
Thus, we have obviously this intermediate result:
Theorem 16. If m is on the form m = p i q j where p q are two odd primes with p < q and i, j are two non-zero integers, B has coefficients in {−1, 0, 1} and B 1 = 2p. More precisely we have:
where we denote B pq the matrix of β for m = pq.
Therefore by 8, the significant case is when m is a square-free integer, but we can even get through the case where m is even. Let k be an odd integer. Again by the definition of cyclotomic polynomials, we have a formula which links the 2k th cyclotomic polynomial to the k th cyclotomic polynomial:
The theorem 8, which we recall and complete, naturally follows.
Theorem 17. If m is on the form m = 2 k p i q j where p q are two odd primes with p < q, k ∈ N and i, j are two non-zero integers, B has coefficients in {−1, 0, 1} and B 1 = 2p. More precisely we have:
where we denote for a matrix M , |M | the matrix whose the coefficients are the absolute value of the one of M , and B pq is the matrix of β for m = pq.
